greeneclipse
8580c996c3
Drop one-shot tmp/axe scripts and agent i18n scratch so the Gitea tree is deployable.
84 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
84 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
# Self-serve forgot-password — gap & recommended design
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**Assessment date:** 2026-08-08
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**Verdict:** **Out of scope for a minimal safe reuse.** Document only until a dedicated reset feature is approved.
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**Mail infra:** Existing SMTP/`mail.Send` is enough; **do not** build a new mail stack. Confirm product copy/TTL/rate limits before implementing.
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Related: [status-and-gaps.md](status-and-gaps.md), [ux-backlog.md](ux-backlog.md) (P0-10 set-password), [live-auth-security.md](live-auth-security.md), [migration-readiness.md](migration-readiness.md).
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---
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## What exists today (not forgot-password)
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| Piece | Role | Why it cannot serve “I forgot my password” |
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|-------|------|--------------------------------------------|
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| `must_set_password` + `auth.SetPassword` | First password after migration / bootstrap | Update requires `must_set_password = true`; returns `ErrPasswordAlreadySet` otherwise |
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| `ReissueSetPasswordInvite` | Admin re-issue durable invite | Requires `must_set_password` + active membership; ineligible for accounts that already set a password |
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| `AcceptInvite` | Invite / first-password accept | Existing users with password must **verify** current password — does not reset |
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| HMAC `IssueSetPasswordToken` + `handleCompleteSetPassword` | Token complete for first-set | Calls `SetPassword` → same `must_set_password` gate |
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| Admin `POST …/admin/…` set-password email | Operator-only bulk/single send | AuthZ + eligibility same as above; login CTA points here (no public resend) — see P0-10 |
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| `mail.SetPasswordMessage` / `MigratedSetPasswordMessage` | Email copy + `/accept-invite` links | Templates/links are first-set oriented; reusable **patterns** only |
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| Login UI | `password_not_set` CTA → `/accept-invite` + admin Users | No “Forgot password?” link |
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**Operator workarounds today:** platform admin re-issues set-password for `must_set_password` users; local/dev `ForceSetPassword` / migrator `-set-password` for bootstrap. Neither is self-serve recovery for users who already know they had a password.
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---
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## Why a “small patch” is unsafe
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Reusing invite/HMAC set-password for established accounts would require relaxing `must_set_password` (or calling `ForceSetPassword` from a public token path). That collapses first-set and reset semantics, weakens single-use guarantees for HMAC tokens (no DB row until success), and risks account takeover if the public request endpoint is naively bolted on.
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Intentional product gap (Wave 8): **no public self-serve resend** for set-password (P0-10).
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---
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## Recommended design (when approved)
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Reuse **mail delivery and rate-limit patterns** from admin set-password; add a **separate** reset purpose. Do not overload `must_set_password` / `AcceptInvite`.
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### API (sketch)
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1. **`POST /api/auth/forgot-password`** `{ "email": "…" }`
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- Always return the same opaque success (anti-enumeration).
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- Rate-limit by IP + normalized email (mirror admin set-password limiters).
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- If active user with deliverable email: issue **reset** token (prefer durable hashed row, invite-style; HMAC-only only if single-use store is added).
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- Skip synthetic `@legacy.local` silently.
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- Send `ForgotPasswordMessage` (new; link to `/reset-password?token=…`, not accept-invite first-set mode).
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2. **`POST /api/auth/reset-password`** `{ "token", "password" }`
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- Validate token; set new argon2id hash for that user **regardless of** `must_set_password` (dedicated `ResetPassword`, not `SetPassword` / not public `ForceSetPassword`).
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- Invalidate token; optionally revoke other sessions.
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- Clear `must_set_password` if still set.
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### Web
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- Login: “Forgot password?” → `/forgot-password`.
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- `/forgot-password`: email form + generic confirmation copy.
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- `/reset-password`: password + confirm; strip `?token=` from URL like accept-invite.
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### Security checklist
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- Constant-time / uniform responses and timing where practical.
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- Token TTL short (e.g. 1h); one-time consume.
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- CSRF on cookie-authenticated POSTs; public forgot/reset still need CSRF if under same cookie middleware.
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- No token in list APIs or HTML; prefer `#token=` / exchange code later ([live-auth-security.md](live-auth-security.md) residual).
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- Tests: happy path, expired/reuse, unknown email response shape, rate limit, inactive user, synthetic email.
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### Explicitly out of this design
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- New mail provider, queue, or template engine (extend `internal/mail`).
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- Turning admin set-password into a public endpoint.
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- Logged-in “change password” (optional follow-up; separate from forgot).
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---
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## Implementation status
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| Item | Status |
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|------|--------|
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| Self-serve forgot / reset | **Implemented** (`041_password_reset_tokens`, `POST /api/auth/forgot-password`, `POST /api/auth/reset-password`, `/forgot-password` + `/reset-password`, i18n) |
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| Migration first-set + admin re-issue | Implemented (P0-10) |
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| Mail SMTP send path | Implemented; forgot-password reuses `mail.Send` + `EMAIL_DRY_RUN` / `ApplyDryRun` |
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**ASSUMPTION:** Opaque `{status:"ok"}` responses; TTL **1h**; IP 10/min + email 3/hour limiters; no session revoke on reset (optional follow-up).
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