descrybe/apps/api/internal/httpapi/login_lockout.go

package httpapi

import (
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"time"
)

// Email-keyed login lockout (in-process, per API replica).
//
// Complements IP RateLimitAuth: rotating IPs still hit the same email budget.
// ASSUMPTION (Product 10): a single API instance (or acknowledged per-replica
// memory) is acceptable — same posture as HTTP rate limiters in ratelimit.go.
// RATE_LIMIT_REPLICAS does not divide this lockout; multi-replica hard caps need edge/WAF.
// Captcha is deferred; lockout + IP RPM are the primary login abuse controls.

const (
	loginLockoutMaxFails = 5
	loginLockoutDuration = 15 * time.Minute
)

type loginLockState struct {
	fails       int
	windowStart time.Time
	lockedUntil time.Time
}

// loginAttemptLockout tracks failed password attempts by normalized email.
type loginAttemptLockout struct {
	mu       sync.Mutex
	maxFails int
	lockFor  time.Duration
	state    map[string]*loginLockState
}

func newLoginAttemptLockout(maxFails int, lockFor time.Duration) *loginAttemptLockout {
	if maxFails < 1 {
		maxFails = loginLockoutMaxFails
	}
	if lockFor <= 0 {
		lockFor = loginLockoutDuration
	}
	return &loginAttemptLockout{
		maxFails: maxFails,
		lockFor:  lockFor,
		state:    make(map[string]*loginLockState),
	}
}

func normalizeLoginEmail(email string) string {
	return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(email))
}

// locked reports whether email is currently locked and Retry-After seconds.
func (l *loginAttemptLockout) locked(email string) (bool, int) {
	key := normalizeLoginEmail(email)
	if key == "" || l == nil {
		return false, 0
	}
	now := time.Now()
	l.mu.Lock()
	defer l.mu.Unlock()
	st := l.state[key]
	if st == nil {
		return false, 0
	}
	if st.lockedUntil.After(now) {
		sec := int(st.lockedUntil.Sub(now).Seconds()) + 1
		if sec < 1 {
			sec = 1
		}
		return true, sec
	}
	if !st.lockedUntil.IsZero() && !st.lockedUntil.After(now) {
		// Lock expired — reset failure window.
		delete(l.state, key)
	}
	return false, 0
}

// recordFailure increments the failure count for email; locks after maxFails
// within the lock window. No-ops for empty email.
func (l *loginAttemptLockout) recordFailure(email string) {
	key := normalizeLoginEmail(email)
	if key == "" || l == nil {
		return
	}
	now := time.Now()
	l.mu.Lock()
	defer l.mu.Unlock()
	st := l.state[key]
	if st == nil {
		st = &loginLockState{windowStart: now}
		l.state[key] = st
	}
	if st.lockedUntil.After(now) {
		return
	}
	if !st.lockedUntil.IsZero() && !st.lockedUntil.After(now) {
		st.fails = 0
		st.windowStart = now
		st.lockedUntil = time.Time{}
	}
	if now.Sub(st.windowStart) > l.lockFor {
		st.fails = 0
		st.windowStart = now
	}
	st.fails++
	if st.fails >= l.maxFails {
		st.lockedUntil = now.Add(l.lockFor)
		st.fails = 0
		st.windowStart = now
	}
}

// clear resets failures and lock for email (successful login).
func (l *loginAttemptLockout) clear(email string) {
	key := normalizeLoginEmail(email)
	if key == "" || l == nil {
		return
	}
	l.mu.Lock()
	defer l.mu.Unlock()
	delete(l.state, key)
}

func (s *Server) loginAttempts() *loginAttemptLockout {
	if s == nil {
		return newLoginAttemptLockout(loginLockoutMaxFails, loginLockoutDuration)
	}
	s.loginLockoutOnce.Do(func() {
		s.loginLockout = newLoginAttemptLockout(loginLockoutMaxFails, loginLockoutDuration)
	})
	return s.loginLockout
}